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I. INTRODUCTION
Four years ago, my father began his second career as a high school
history teacher for the Edgewood Independent School District in San
Antonio, Texas. The Edgewood School District, which consists predomi-
nately of Mexican-American students, has always been San Antonio's
poorest. Nevertheless, my father, with a gifted understanding of Ameri-
can history, was anxious to teach his new students about America and the
American Dream.
After his first day of teaching, however, my father came home looking
a little dejected. He was saddened and overwhelmed because so many of
the high school seniors in his class lacked a fundamental understanding
about America and its history. In fact, some of the seniors in his class
thought Ronald Reagan was still President and that Texas was a country.
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He did not know how to teach these students to achieve the American
Dream, as they did not even possess a basic understanding of America or
what the American Dream is all about.
I spent most of my childhood growing up in a modest middle-class
neighborhood on the northwest side of San Antonio. My neighborhood
provided me with a sense of security and safety. In fact, one of my most
vivid childhood memories is the strong sense of community that my fam-
ily shared with our neighbors. I seldom heard the sounds of police sirens
or saw graffiti on walls or fences. At a very early age, however, I realized
that not everyone was fortunate enough to experience this sense of
security.
Since both my parents worked, my sister and I often stayed with our
grandmother after school and during the summer months. Her neighbor-
hood was very different from our own, and her neighbors were very poor.
Inadequate education and lack of occupational mobility seemed to plague
the lives of her neighbors. As a youngster playing in my grandmother's
backyard, I constantly heard police sirens in the distance. I remember
passing graffiti-stained walls and fences as I walked to the corner market.
Potholes covered the unpaved streets in my grandmother's neighborhood,
and I distinctly remember breathing the dust and dirt from cars passing
by. Looking back, it was obvious that my grandmother's neighborhood
did not receive the same municipal services or economic opportunities
that my neighborhood received. I often wondered why there was such a
disparity between my middle-class neighborhood and my grandmother's
neighborhood. My curiosity grew as I began to realize that many north-
side neighborhoods seemed to reflect the ideal American neighborhood,
while many west-side neighborhoods reflected the stereotypical Ameri-
can slum. As a child, I constantly wondered why west-side neighbor-
hoods, which were predominately Mexican-American, were so poor,
while the north-side, Anglo-American neighborhoods were so prosper-
ous. Today, as a law student, I find myself still searching for an answer.
The purpose of this comment is to examine how racially restrictive cov-
enants of the past, which, although no longer enforced, continue to affect
the educational opportunities of today's Mexican-American community
in San Antonio, Texas. Mexican Americans in San Antonio have tradi-
tionally lived in poor economic and social conditions.1 While examining
1. See LEo GREBLER E AL, THE MFXICAN-AMERICAN PEoPm Tim NArnoN's SEc-
oND LARGEST MiNoRrr 305 tbl13-5 (1970) (charting the income level of Mexican Ameri-
cans between 1959 and 1966); Robert Brischetto, Charles L Cotrell & R. Michael Stevens,
Conflict and Change in the Political Culture of San Antonio in the 1970s, in T1iE PoLMrrcs
OF SAN ANTOrNo: COMMUNrrY, PROGRESS, & POWER 75,75-76 (David R. Johnson et al.
eds., 1983); JoAN W. MooRE, MEICAN AMERICANS 9 (1970) (comparing the living condi-
tions of Mexican Americans to national standards).
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these poor social and economic conditions, one could hypothesize that
Mexican Americans living in San Antonio's west-side neighborhoods2
would face a difficult transition to American middle-class society. Poor
education and a lack of occupational opportunities are among several fac-
tors that have contributed to this hypothesis.'
From a legal perspective, however, racially restrictive covenants have
played an influential role in detracting from the educational opportunity
of Mexican Americans in San Antonio. Using an analysis of case law and
other academic research, this comment will examine how racially restric-
tive covenants eliminated educational opportunities for Mexican
Americans.
Part II of this comment examines the historical background of racially
restrictive covenants in San Antonio and how they were used to separate
Mexican Americans from the rest of the city. Part III examines the long-
term impact racially restrictive covenants have had on Mexican Ameri-
cans. Specifically, Part III examines how racially restrictive covenants
forced Mexican Americans to live in certain neighborhoods and attend
poorly funded schools, depriving these students of educational opportuni-
ties. In the end, these racially restrictive covenants have served to isolate
Mexican Americans from the rest of American society. Part IV strives to
find a remedy that will undo the harm inflicted on the Mexican-American
community.
II. HISTOICAL BACKGROUND
A. Racially Restrictive Deed Covenants
Many scholars of minority issues contend that America no longer
seems to be concerned with racial segregation.4 They argue that many
2. See generally GREBLER Er AL., supra note 1, at 307-12 (providing historical back-
ground on Mexican Americans living in San Antonio and Los Angeles); Richard A.
Gambitta et al., The Politics of Unequal Educational Opportunity, in THE PoLrIcs OF SAN
ANTONIO: COMMUNITY, PROGRESS, & POWER 133, 141 (David R. Johnson et al. eds.,
1983).
3. See GREBLER ET AL, supra note 1, at 302-06 (describing the educational and occu-
pational status of Mexican Americans in San Antonio); Brischetto, Cotrell & Stevens,
supra note 1, at 93-94; Richard J. Harris, Mexican-American Occupational Attainments it
San Antonio: Comparative Assessments, in THE PoLIrics OF SAN ANTONIO: COMMUNITY,
PROGRESS, & POWER 53, 60-71 (David R. Johnson et al. eds., 1983) (describing the occupa-
tional factors that contribute to the creation of the poor working class status of Mexican
Americans in San Antonio).
4. See Reggie Oh, Comment, Apartheid in America: Residential Segregation and the
Color-Line in the Twenty-First Century, 15 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 385,388 (1995) (stating
that residential segregation is a "forgotten factor in American race relations"); Marc
Seitles, Comment, The Perpetuation of Residential Racial Segregation in America: Histori-
cal Discrimination, Modern Forms of Exclusion, and Inclusionary Remedies, 14 J. LAND
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Anglo Americans are not aware of the destructive environment created
by segregation.5 Several of these minority scholars contend that racial
segregation, which many minority groups still face, is at the root of
America's poverty.6 Specifically, these critics contend that residential
segregation has played a major role in creating and sustaining poverty
within the Mexican-American community.7
Residential segregation prevents members of a particular minority
group from living in a certain part of a city simply because of their race or
ethnic background.8 African Americans have experienced the greatest
amount of residential segregation.9 As a result, social scientists have con-
UsE & ENvL- L. 89 (1998) (stating that the word segregation is no longer used in the
American social and political landscape); see also DouoLAs S. MAssEy & NANcy A.
DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS
4 (1993) (stating that residential segregation had become a largely forgotten racial issue by
the late 1970s).
5. See Oh, supra note 4, at 388-89 (asserting that segregation still exists today in the
United States and Anglo Americans are unaware of the destructive environment that seg-
regation creates); see also MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 4, at 11 (relating how the pat-
terns of Anglo-American prejudice contribute to residential segregation).
6. See Oh, supra note 4, at 388-89 (arguing that segregation and poverty created a
destructive neighborhood envirofiment); Seitles, supra note 4, at 103; see also MASSEY &
DENTON, supra note 4, at 9 ("Residential segregation is the principal organizational feature
of American society that is responsible for the creation of the urban underclass").
7. See George A. Martinez, Legal Indeterninac Judicial Discretion and the Merican-
American Litigation Experience: 1930-1980, 27 U.C. DAvis L R-v. 555, 569 (1994)
(describing how white citizens in various cities used restrictive covenants to force racial
minorities into a subordinate position); D. 0. McGovney, Racial Residential Segregation by
State Court Enforcement of Restrictive Agreements, Covenants or Conditions in Deeds Is
Unconstitutional, 33 CA.I L. REv. 5, 37 (1945); see also MooRE, supra note 1, at 8-9
(describing survey results that indicate ninety-five percent of the Mexican-American popu-
lation in San Antonio acknowledges discrimination from the Anglo community).
8. See Martinez, supra note 7, at 569-70 (describing how the white majority used re-
strictive covenants to prohibit the sale or lease of property to persons of a particular na-
tional origin, race, or religion from buying or leasing certain property); Oh, supra note 4, at
388-90 (providing a historical description of how white citizens created racially segregated
neighborhoods through violent threats or civil mechanisms); see also ROBERT A. Wnso.i
& DAvrD A. ScHuLz, UiuAN SOCIOLOGY 275-76 (1978).
9. Jon C. Dubin, Front Junkyards to Gentrificationw Explicating a Right to Protective
Zoning in Low-Income Communities of Color, 77 Mu'N. L REv. 739, 774 (1993) (stating
that African Americans have experienced more residential segregation than any other mi-
nority group); Oh, supra note 4, at 389-90 (providing a historical description of how white
citizens of different towns created racially segregated neighborhoods through violence,
threats, and civil mechanisms); see also Joe T. Darden, Accessibility to Housing: Differen-
tial Residential Segregation for Blacks, Hispanics, American Indians and Asians, in RAcE,
Eam-acrrY, AND Mn oirn HousING IN THE UNIED STATES 107, 124 (Jamshid A.
Momeni ed., 1986) (asserting that African Americans are the most segregated minority
group in American society, while Americans of Asian descent are the least segregated).
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ducted extensive research on the effect of residential segregation on Afri-
can Americans.10
Social scientists conclude that the general pattern of residential segre-
gation is often related to the degree of assimilation of that particular im-
migrant group into American mainstream society." Generally,
assimilation into American society requires "that immigrant or foreign
cultures should blend into the fabric of American society."' 2 The under-
lying assumption is that Anglo-Saxon Protestant values define American
society.' 3 However, Mexican Americans do not fit into this paradigm of
American assimilation.'4 San Antonio's proximity to the Mexican border
has made it difficult for Mexican Americans in San Antonio to experi-
ence the same kind of assimilation often experienced by European
immigrants.15
The level of residential segregation Mexican Americans endure varies
between different regions of the United States. 6 For instance, Mexican
Americans are moving out of poor neighborhoods faster in Los Angeles,
California than in Odessa, Texas.' 7 Therefore, the level of residential
segregation encountered by Mexican Americans does not resemble the
general pattern of residential segregation that other ethnic groups face.18
10. See Dubin, supra note 9, at 774 n.159 (describing how researchers have created
well-documented studies on the effects of segregation on African-American communities).
11. See MOORE, supra note 1, at 109; WILSON & SCHULZ, supra note 8, at 265-66
(describing how immigrant groups settled and maintained neighborhoods in America, but
eventually formed a cultural polyglot); Harris, supra note 3, at 56.
12. Carlos Villarreal, Culture in Lawmaking: A Chicano Perspective, 24 U.C. DAVis
L. Rnv. 1193, 1196 (1991) (defining American mainstream ideals); see also ALFREDO
MIRANDa, GRINGO JusrncE 217-18 (1987) (describing the "order-pluralistic and conflict
models" which represent the oldest sociological model explaining how immigrant groups
assimilate into the predominant culture); RICHARD T. SCHAEFER, SOCIOLOoY 226 (1983)
(defining assimilation as "the process by which an individual forsakes his or her own cul-
tural tradition to become part of a different culture").
13. See SCHAEFER, supra note 12, at 226 (describing how assimilation occurs among
minority groups who want to conform to the standards of the American majority); Ken-
neth Karst, Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and Cultural Identity, 64 N.C. L. Rnv.
303, 312-13 (1986) (describing the history of "Anglo conformity" becoming a benchmark
for American assimilation); Villarreal, supra note 12, at 1197.
14. See MIRANDI, supra note 12, at 219-20. Mirandd notes how the order-pluralistic
and conflict models fail to adequately explain the assimilation process Mexican Americans
experience. See id. Unlike European immigrants, many of the ancestors of today's Mexi-
can-American population were already living within the modem United States border. See
id.; see also MOORE, supra note 1, at 109. See generally GREBLER ET AL., supra note 1.
15. WILSON & SCHULZ, supra note 8, at 277.
16. See MOORE, supra note 1, at 109.
17. See id. at 110.
18. See id. (detailing specific examples how Mexican-American segregation patterns
differ from those of other minority groups).
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Unlike other ethnic groups, Mexican-American segregation is not in-
versely correlated to duration of residence in the United States. t 9 Gener-
ally, Mexican Americans are less segregated from Anglos than African
Americans.2' Very few legal scholars, however, have examined how the
legal enforcement of racially restrictive covenants contributed to the poor
social and economic status of Mexican Americans.21
Throughout America's history, residential segregation has played a ma-
jor role in urban settings. Towns throughout the United States created
segregated neighborhoods and prevented the integration of white neigh-
borhoods.' producing practical implications on minority groups. 3 Resi-
dential segregation contributes to de facto24 school segregation, poor
public transportation, and limited employment opportunities? 5 As a re-
sult, minority groups who encounter residential segregation suffer poor
social and economic conditions.
Residential segregation did not occur by chance, but rather by design. 6
In many instances, local city governments contributed to segregation. For
example, many cities used urban renewal projects and urban planning
techniques to create segregated neighborhoods.27 Many towns also cre-
ated segregationist zoning ordinances that divided citizens geographically
along racial lines. 8 Ironically, the federal government also played a role
19. See id.
20. GREBLER Er AL., supra note 1, at 274 (comparing the different levels of segrega-
tion between Mexican Americans and African Americans).
21. See Martinez, supra note 7, at 557 (asserting that legal issues which affect Mexican
Americans are generally not brought to the forefront).
22. GREBLER Er AL., supra note 1, at 272; see also Dubin, supra note 9, at 744-45
(describing racial zoning ordinances in different cities throughout the United States).
23. GREBLER Er AL-, supra note 1, at 272 (describing the potential negative effects of
residential segregation); WILSON & ScHuLz, supra note 8, at 275-81 (providing insight as to
how segregation affects different minority groups); Gambitta et al., supra note 2, at 141.
24. De facto segregation is segregation which results without purposeful action by
government officials; real or actual segregation which results from social, psychological, or
economic conditions. BARRoN's LAW DICIONARY 131 (1999).
25. Brischetto, Cotrell & Stevens, supra note 1, at 76. See also Gambitta et al., supra
note 2, at 141.
26. See Dubin, supra note 9, at 744-45 (describing how, during the early part of the
twentieth century, border cities as well as other southern cities enacted strict racial zoning
ordinances to separate blacks from whites); Seitles, supra note 4, at 89, 91 (asserting that
various minority groups were intentionally excluded from associating with whites); see also
GEORGE R. MECALF, FAIR Housn'G CoMns OF AGE 149 (1988).
27. See Dubin, supra note 9, at 776 (asserting that public housing sites and urban
renewal policies have served to confine Hispanics to segregated and inferior housing); see
also Seitles, supra note 4, at 89, 91 (describing various political techniques used to segre-
gate neighborhoods).
28. See Dubin, supra note 9, at 757-64 (describing how local governments used land
controls and ordinances to not only place blacks in residentially inferior environments, but
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in creating residential segregation throughout some parts of the nation.
The Federal Housing Authority used a technique called "redlining"2 9 as a
tool to segregate neighborhoods.3" These exclusionary practices pre-
vented minorities from living in suburban areas of a community.31 As a
result, minorities were excluded from the superior educational and em-
ployment opportunities offered in suburban neighborhoods.3"
B. San Antonio's History and Racially Restrictive Covenants
Like many American cities, San Antonio's neighborhoods are divided
along ethnic lines. For generations, San Antonio citizens have recognized
San Antonio's west-side neighborhoods, which consist predominantly of
Mexican Americans, as being poor and deteriorated. 33 Likewise, many
San Antonio citizens associate the east-side neighborhoods, which consist
predominately of African Americans, as similarly deteriorated and un-
derdeveloped.34 However, San Antonio's Anglo, north-side neighbor-
hoods are predominantly suburban and middle-class. 35
to also diminish their general quality of life); Herbert Hovenkamp, Social Science and Seg-
regation Before Brown, 1985 DUKE L.J. 624, 657 (1985) (stating that Baltimore passed a
city ordinance that created separate residential districts for blacks and whites); Seitles,
supra note 4, at 89, 92 (describing how zoning ordinances were used to segregate
neighborhoods).
29. "Redlining" is unlawful discrimination by a financial institution that refuses to
make loan on properties in allegedly bad neighborhoods. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (7th
ed. 1999). The Federal Home Owners Loan Corporation initiated the policy of "redlin-
ing," which categorized neighborhoods into a color scheme. See MASSEY & DENTON,
supra note 4, at 51 n.1.
30. Seitles, supra note 4, at 92. See also MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 4, at 52 n.1.
31. Seitles, supra note 4, at 96. See also Bernard Ham, Exclusionary Zoning and Ra-
cial Segregation: A Reconsideration of the Mount Laurel Doctrine, 7 SETON HALL CONST.
L.J. 577, 587 (1997); Martinez, supra note 7, at 569 (providing insight as to how the white
majority used legal mechanisms to exclude minorities from white residential areas).
32. Seitles, supra note 4, at 96. See also Brischetto, Cotrell & Stevens, supra note 1, at
76 (asserting that Mexican Americans are poorer, less educated, and live in worse housing
than their Anglo counterparts).
33. See Gambitta et al., supra note 2, at 141 (detailing how restrictive covenants in
property deeds helped preserve the segregation in San Antonio); see also RiCIIARt A.
GARCIA, RISE OF THE MEXICAN AMERICAN MIDDLE CLASS: SAN ANTONIO: 1929-1941, at
39 (1991) (describing the housing conditions of San Antonio's west-side neighborhoods);
RODoLFO ROSALES, THE ILLUSION OF INCLUSION: TuE UNTOLD POLITICAL. STORY OF SAN
ANTONIO 5 (2000) (describing the formation of San Antonio's west-side neighborhoods as
a result of restrictive covenants).
34. See GARCIA, supra note 33, at 39 (describing the housing conditions of San
Antonio's east-side neighborhoods); Brischetto, Cotrell & Stevens, supra note 1, at 76
(stating that San Antonio's east side consists predominantly of African Americans).
35. See GARCIA, supra note 33, at 39 (describing the housing conditions of San
Antonio's north-side neighborhoods). See generally Brischetto, Cotrell & Stevens, supra
note 1, at 76.
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This type of residential segregation along ethnic lines is not unique to
San Antonio; other towns throughout South Texas have experienced sim-
ilar types of residential segregation. For many of these South Texas
towns, ethnic divisions were created when the towns were first settled? 6
Many towns openly and explicitly segregated different parts of their com-
munities.3 7 For example, McAllen segregated neighborhoods with the
help of the local realty agencies. 38 These realty agencies would sell
homes to Mexican Americans in a particular part of town.39
Nearby, Weslaco enacted municipal ordinances that forced Mexican
Americans to live in a specific part of town.40 The residential segregation
throughout these towns often had a common result. Anglo-American
neighborhoods consisted of nice homes, paved streets, and working sewer
lines, while Mexican-American homes consisted of shacks, dirt roads and
outhouses.4'
Mexican Americans living in San Antonio also suffered from racially
restrictive covenants. Racially restrictive covenants played a major role
in creating this ethnic divide by forcing Mexican-American families into
San Antonio's west-side neighborhoods.42 For generations, Mexican
Americans were often treated with social inequality 3 Mexican Ameri-
cans in San Antonio were prevented from buying homes in certain ar-
eas.' During the late 1800s, Mexican Americans, who were servants in
the wealthy neighborhoods in San Antonio, were not allowed to walk the
36. DAVID MoNT-EJANO, ANGLOS Am MExicANs IN TrHE MAKING OF T-xAs, 1836-
1986, at 163 (1987) (describing how the growth of the agricultural industry helped to create
new towns that were segregated into Mexican and Anglo areas).
37. Id. at 167 (describing the various instances in which towns instituted segregation in
their own town charters).
38. Id (providing an example how residential segregation was ensured through the
sales practices of the McAllen Real Estate Board).
39. Id.
40. Id (describing an ordinance that the town of Weslaco enacted to keep Mexican-
American neighborhoods in close proximity to industrial complexes).
41. Id. (describing the common result of residential segregation in Texas towns). See
also GARciA, supra note 33, at 39.
42. RosA.Ls, supra note 33, at 5. See also Gambitta et al., supra note 2, at 141 (stat-
ing how restrictive racial covenants separated Mexican Americans and Anglos).
43. See GARciA, supra note 33, at 28 (describing the social and economic segregation
Mexican Americans experienced). See generally Gambitta et al., supra note 2, at 142
(describing the social, political, and economic inequality experienced by Mexican
Americans).
44. Brischetto, Cotrell & Stevens, supra note 1, at 76 (describing how many San
Antonio neighborhoods maintained racially restrictive deeds). See also DONALD E. EvE-
Err, SAN ANToNIo's MoNm- VISTA 8 (1999) (quoting a 1907 San Antonio newspaper arti-
cle, describing how newcomers to San Antonio would appreciate the high class suburban
property in restricted districts).
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streets in those neighborhoods after certain hours each day.4 5 During the
1940s, many homes in the northern part of San Antonio contained deed
restrictions or racial covenants that prevented the owner from selling to a
person of Hispanic descent.46 These racially restrictive covenants had a
devastating impact on Mexican Americans living in San Antonio's west-
side neighborhoods. In the 1930s these segregated neighborhoods had
high rates of tuberculosis, venereal disease, and infant mortality.47 In
1939, the San Antonio Housing Authority built the nation's first public
housing project on the west side of San Antonio that housed only Mexi-
can Americans.48 By 1939, San Antonio's west-side neighborhoods were
one of the "most extensive slum areas anywhere in the world., 49
Mexican Americans make up more than half of San Antonio's popula-
tion.50 Although Mexican culture and customs have influenced San
Antonio's cultural scene, Anglo Americans have dominated the political
and economic structure.51 Consequently, Mexican Americans have ex-
perienced social and political inequality.
III. TH LAW OF RACIALLY RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS
Racially restrictive covenants played a major role in contributing to
residential segregation. In many instances, white property owners cre-
ated restrictive deed covenants to exclude people of color from white
neighborhoods.52 During the 1910s and 1920s, state courts upheld and,
45. DIANE CAPITO & MARK WILLIS, SAN ANTONIO OF FOOT 112 (1993).
46. See generally Richardson v. Austin, 278 S.W. 513, 514 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1925) (describing an actual deed covenant that stipulated that the property should
not be sold to "Mexicans or Negroes"). See also Brischetto, Cotrell & Stevens, supra note
1, at 76 (describing the restrictive covenants in deeds throughout San Antonio); Gambitta
et al., supra note 2, at 141 (stating that restrictive covenants help preserve segregation in
San Antonio).
47. See ROSALES, supra note 33, at 5 (describing the unhealthy living conditions that
existed in San Antonio's west-side neighborhoods while racially restrictive covenants were
being enforced).
48. See Jeanee Russell, Integration Difficult for San Antonio Housing Authority; Local
Officials Cites Neighborhood Ties, SAN ANTONIO ExPRFnss-NEws, Apr. 2,2000, at B1 (stat-
ing the San Antonio Housing Authority segregated its housing projects by building the
Victoria Court housing project for Anglos and the Wheatley and Lincoln housing projects
for African Americans).
49. GARCIA, supra note 33, at 39.
50. Brischetto, Cotrell & Stevens, supra note 1, at 75 (stating the demographic
makeup of San Antonio).
51. Brischetto, Cotrell & Stevens, supra note 1, at 75.
52. Martinez, supra note 7, at 569 (describing how deed covenants were used to create
segregated housing).
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enforced these racially restrictive covenants.5" State courts applied the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Rule Against
Restraints on Alienation to determine if a racially restrictive covenant
was valid.54 These state courts often held that preventing a black family
from moving into a white neighborhood did not violate the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or the Rule Against Restraints on
Alienation. 5 Simply stated, the enforcement of these racially restrictive
covenants forced non-Anglo families to live in communities that were
residentially segregated.
Although most state courts agreed that covenants restricting alienation
of property were void, 6 some courts upheld covenants that restricted
alienation to non-Anglo families.' Sadly, some state courts across the
country upheld deed provisions that prevented black families from living
in white neighborhoods.5" The following cases illustrate the hypocritical
and flawed reasoning state courts used to uphold racially restrictive cove-
nants. Although many of the cases discussed involve African-American
litigants, 9 these rulings also applied to Mexican Americans and other
non-white families throughout the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s.
53. Liberty Annex Corp. v. City of Dallas, 289 S.W. 1067, 1069 (Tex. App. 1926) (up-
holding racially restrictive covenants).
54. Arthur T. Martin, Segregation of Residences of Negroes, 32 MxcH. L REv. 721
(1934) (describing the standards courts used to determine whether a racially restrictive
covenant was valid).
55. See generally Los Angeles Inv. Co. v. Gary, 186 P. 596 (Cal. 1919) (upholding a
racially restrictive covenant); Fairchild v. Raines, 143 P.2d 528 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1944);
Clark v. Vaughan, 292 P. 783 (Kan. 1930); Meade v. Dennistone, 196 A. 330 (Md. 1938);
Lyons v. Wallen, 133 P.2d 555 (Okla. 1942); Liberty Anner, 289 S.W. 1067.
56. See generally Stamey v. McGinnis, 89 S.E. 935, 936 (Ga. 1916) (holding that words
of limitation of sale are a restraint on alienation and void); Jones v. Port Juron Engine and
Thresher Co., 49 N.E. 700 (Ill. 1898) (finding no exceptions to restraints on alienation);
Seay v. Cockrell, 41 S.W. 1160 (Tenn. 1909) (holding that any prohibition on selling prop-
erty is a restraint on alienation and void).
57. Martin, supra note 54, at 735 (describing how courts allowed a restriction on alien-
ation if the restriction was limited in time duration). See generally McGinnis, 88 S.E. 935
(stating that clear words of limitation are an effectual restraint on alienation); Jones, 49
N.E. 700 (finding no exceptions to restraints on alienation); Cockrell, 41 S.W. 1160 (hold-
ing that any prohibition on selling property is a restraint on alienation).
58. See generally Gary, 186 P. 596 (upholding a racially restrictive covenant); Raines,
143 P.2d 528; Clark, 292 P. 783; Meade, 196 A. 330; Wallen, 133 P.2d 555; Liberty Annex,
289 S.W. 1067.
59. See Gary, 186 P. 596; Raines, 143 P.2d 528; Clark, 292 P. 783; Meade, 196 A. 330;
Wallen, 133 P.2d 555; Christie v. Lyons, 47 P.2d 275 (Okla. 1935); Veal v. Hopps, 80 P.2d
275 (Okla. 1938).
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A. State Courts Side-Step Traditional Doctrines Simply to Prevent
Non-White Families from Living in White Neighborhoods
In Los Angeles Investment Company v. Gary,6" the appellant argued
that the California Supreme Court should uphold his racially restrictive
covenant, which prevented a black family from moving into a white
neighborhood.61 The appellant conveyed his lot to a third party with a
deed provision stating that the third party could not sell, lease, or rent to
anyone other than whites.62 However, the appellee, an African-Ameri-
can family, argued that the racial covenant restricted alienation and
should be considered void.63 The family argued that the general long-
standing rule regarding prohibition of alienation was based upon the pub-
lic policy preference to eliminate impediments to the alienability of
land. '
The Gary court claimed to have understood the concept that restraints
on alienation are void.65 Nevertheless, the court upheld the legitimacy of
the racially restrictive covenant by sidestepping the traditional doctrine
against restrictions on alienation.66 The court agreed with the appellant,
the former lot owner. The court held that the racially restrictive covenant
was not a restriction on alienation.67 Instead, the court reasoned that the
racial covenant was a restriction on the use of property, not a restriction
on the sale of property.68 The court failed to explain why it believed
preventing the sale of property to an African-American family was not a
restriction on alienation, but rather a restriction on use of property. 69 As
a result of the decision in Gary, African-American families were isolated
from the rest of the community and were forced to live in deteriorated
housing.7" If the Gary court had followed case precedent and traditional
property law,71 the Afican-American family would not have been segre-
gated from the community.
60. See Gary, 186 P. 596.
61. See id. at 597 (upholding a racially restrictive covenant).
62. See id. (describing the actual covenant).
63. See id. (arguing that restraints on alienation are void).
64. See id. See also RALPH E. BOYER Er AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY: AN INTRODUC.
TORY SURVEY 144 (4th ed. 1991). The general rule prohibiting alienation is based upon a
public policy preference to eliminate impediments to the alienability of land. See id.
65. See Gary, 186 P. at 597.
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. See generally Jones v. Port Juron Engine and Thresher Co., 49 N.E. 700 (111. 1898)
(finding no exceptions to restraints on alienation); Stamey v. McGinnis, 89 S.E. 935, 936
(Ga. 1916) (words of limitation of sale are a restraint on alienation and void); Seay v.
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B. Enforcement of Racially Restrictive Covenants in the Midwest
In the Midwest, state courts were also upholding racially restrictive
covenants during the 1910s, 1920s, 1930s and 1940s. Lyons v. Wallen' is
another example of a state court circumventing its own case law to up-
hold a racially restrictive covenant. 3 In Lyons, the plaintiff sought to
prevent the Wallens, a black family, from purchasing real property.74 The
plaintiff argued that since seventy percent of homeowners in the approxi-
mate area signed a contract restricting the sale of the lot to "person or
persons of the Negro race," the court should uphold the restriction."
The Wallen family argued that the covenant placed a restraint on aliena-
tion of real property.7 6
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma rejected the Wallens' argument that
the racially restrictive covenant was void and contrary to public policy.
The Wallens cited several cases in support of their argument, " and, un-
like Gary, the court in Lyons noted this use of precedent?8 The Wallens
cited two cases in framing their argument. First, in Christie v. Lyons,79
the Oklahoma State Supreme Court did not enforce a racially restrictive
covenant because only eighty percent of the homeowners signed the
agreement to create the restrictive covenant, which was not enough to
uphold the restriction.' The second case cited was Veal v. Hopps.st In
Veal, the Oklahoma State Supreme Court also refused to enforce a ra-
cially restrictive covenant because less than two-thirds of the white own-
ers signed the contract that created the restriction.P
Cockrell, 41 S.W. 1160 (Tenn. 1909) (holding that any prohibition on selling property is a
restraint on alienation and void).
72. Lyons v. Wallen, 133 P.2d 555 (Okla. 1942).
73. See generally id.
74. See id. at 556.
75. Id. (describing a racially restrictive covenant that was used to prevent a black fam-
ily from living in a white neighborhood).
76. See id. at 557 (describing the court's ability and willingness to enforce a racially
restrictive covenant on real property).
77. See generally Christie v. Lyons, 47 P.2d 275 (Okla. 1935) (citing cases supportive of
the Wallens' argument); see also Veal v. Hopps, 80 P.2d 275 (Okla. 1938) (holding racially
restrictive covenant not binding since not enough white home owners agreed to the restric-
tive covenant when it was first enacted).
78. See Wallen, 133 P.2d at 557 (describing the court's ability to enforce a racially
restrictive covenant on real property).
79. Christie, 47 P.2d 128.
80. See id. at 129 (providing an example of how the Oklahoma State Supreme Court
would not enforce an agreement by home owners to create a racially restrictive covenant).
81. Hopps, 80 P.2d 275.
82. See id. at 278 (describing an example of the Oklahoma Supreme Court not enforc-
ing an agreement by home owners to create a racially restrictive covenant, because the
contract required nine-tenths of the lot owners to sign, which had not occurred).
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Again, as in Gary, the Lyons court issued a ridiculous ruling against the
African-American family. Although the court noted that the law did not
favor covenants restricting the sale of land, the court nonetheless found
the covenant enforceable where the "intention of the parties [was]
clear.",83 As in Gary, this court's reasoning appeared hypocritical and
flawed when it chose to set aside its own laws and precedents simply to
prevent a black family from living in a white neighborhood.
C. By Enforcing Racially Restrictive Covenants State Courts Refuse to
Recognize Constitutional Rights of Non-White Citizens
State courts of the eastern United States were also upholding deed re-
strictions preventing blacks from living in white neighborhoods. Meade v.
Dennistone84 is another clear example of a state court setting aside its
own law and precedent to prevent African Americans from moving into a
white neighborhood. 85 In Meade, the appellee, Dennistone, tried to en-
join an African-American family from occupying a house in Baltimore,
Maryland.86 Dennistone was a long-time resident of the neighborhood
and based his claim on the ground that he, along "with fifteen other own-
ers of property in the 2200 block of Barclay," agreed to create a racially
restrictive covenant that did not allow "Negroes" to use or occupy prop-
erty in the surrounding area. 7 The African-American family argued that
the restraint on alienation denied their right to equal protection under
the Fourteenth Amendment. 88 The court, however, disagreed. The court
based its ruling on the notion that the constitutional amendments do not
prohibit private individuals from entering into contracts regarding the
control of their property.8 9 Furthermore, the court reasoned that restric-
tions on alienation are only repugnant when the covenant tends to harm
the estate's value. 90 In this case, the court believed that the racially re-
strictive covenants did not devalue the estate.91 The court finally con-
cluded that the "law is powerless in eradicating racial difficulties between
individuals," 92 and that the government should not try to interfere in the
83. Wallen, 133 P.2d at 557 (stating that courts can enforce racially restrictive
covenants).
84. 196 A. 330 (Md. 1938).
85. See id. (noting that the Maryland Supreme Court refused to allow an African-
American family to live in a white neighborhood).
86. See id. (describing the location of the restrictive covenant).
87. Id. at 331 (describing the language used in the covenant).
88. Id at 333 (describing Meades' argument that the contract violated their constitu-
tional rights).
89. See id. at 334.
90. See id.
91. See id. at 335.
92. Id.
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private dealings between individuals.93 The Mead court not only set aside
its own case law, but also side-stepped constitutional issues simply to pre-
vent an African-American family from moving into a white neighbor-
hood. As in Lyons and Gary, the court in Mead upheld a deed provision
that prevented an African-American family from living in a white neigh-
borhood, perpetuating residential segregation.
D. Under State Court Rulings, Racially Restrictive Covenants Did Not
Violate the Due Process Rights of Non-White Citizens
There have been several other instances in which state courts have cir-
cumvented constitutional guarantees and denied individuals their consti-
tutional rights. Often, when dealing with a due process challenge, state
courts would reason that since the state was not the primary party en-
gaged in discrimination, the restrictive covenant did not constitute state
action and therefore did not violate due process rights. 94
For example, in Fairchild v. Raines,9" the California State Supreme
Court did not take into account whether the due process rights of the
appellee, a black family, were violated if the racially restrictive covenant
was upheld. 96 The plaintiffs, including Fairchild, tried to enjoin Raines
from occupying a lot in the city of Pasadena. 7 The appellant based his
argument on the ground that a restrictive covenant stipulated that the lots
shall be limited and restricted to occupancy by "persons of the Caucasian
race."98 However, there was an exception to the restrictive covenant. 99
The exception stated that if the white occupant of a lot kept non-white
servants, then the servants would not be in violation of the covenant."°
The court's reasoning did not take into account whether the racially
restrictive covenant violated the Raines family's constitutional rights."'
Instead, the court examined whether the white property owner suffered
any monetary damage as a result of a black family living in the white
neighborhood.0 2 To help the court in its decision, it considered the testi-
93. See id.
94. Martin, supra note 54, at 732 (stating that state courts have no difficulty finding
racially restrictive covenants do not violate the Fourteenth Amendment).
95. Fairchild v. Raines, 143 P.2d 528 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1944).
96. Id. at 532 (failing to consider a black family's constitutional rights).
97. See id. at 529 (describing the town in which the racially restrictive covenant was
upheld).
98. Id at 530 (describing the language of the restrictive covenants).
99. See id (describing the exception as to when non-whites could occupy the lot).
100. Id.
101. See generally id (failing to consider the constitutional rights of the African-
American family in its decision).
102. See id. at 532 (asserting that the only issue that needed to be resolved was
whether the plaintiff suffered any damage if a black family moved into the neighborhood).
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mony of a real estate expert who testified that the property value around
the lot would decrease by fifty percent if a black family moved into the
neighborhood. °3 Consequently, the court held that provisions prevent-
ing a black family from occupying the property were valid and enforcea-
ble. 10 4 It appears that the court in Fairchild believed that the lot owner's
property rights were more significant than constitutional rights afforded
to non-white citizens.
Ironically, there have been cases in which racially restrictive covenants
were successfully challenged. In these cases, however, courts still refused
to consider whether racially restrictive covenants violated the constitu-
tional rights of African Americans. Instead, many of these cases looked
to traditional property case law to decide whether to uphold a racially
restrictive covenant.
In Clark v. Vaughan," 5 the plaintiff tried to enjoin an African-Ameri-
can family from occupying a lot in Kansas City.'0 6 The white lot owner
based his argument on the ground that the deed covenant prohibited the
sale of a lot, within the approximate area, to anyone of the "African
race."' 0 7 However, in an unusual ruling for the time, the court sided with
the defendant, a black family.'08 The court held that the covenant did not
violate the constitutional rights of the black family."0 9 However, the
court also held that enforcing the covenant would be inequitable because
African-American families already occupied many of the lots around the
neighborhood." 0 If the court upheld the restrictive covenant, then the
purpose of the covenant would not be served.
E. Shelley v. Kraemer: A Change Occurs - Was It Too Little,
Too Late?
Courts did not strike down racially restrictive covenants until the late
1940s and early 1950s. In 1948, the Supreme Court of the United States
addressed the issue of racially restrictive covenants in Shelley v. Krae-
mer. 1 Petitioner Shelley, an African-American family, argued that ra-
103. See i. (describing the monetary damage that the plaintiff would incur if the re-
strictive covenant and agreement were invalidated).
104. See id. (upholding and enforcing a racially restrictive covenant).
105. See generally Clark v. Vaughan, 292 P. 783 (Kan. 1930).
106. Id. at 784.
107. Id. (describing the conditions of the racially restrictive covenant).
108. See id. at 786 (holding that the racially restrictive covenant should not be en-
forced because such enforcement would be too burdensome on the black family).
109. See id. at 784 (affirming the validity of racially restrictive covenants).
110. Id. (stating that covenants shall not be enforced if enforcement would result in an
inequitable outcome).
111. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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cially restrictive covenants in deeds violated their constitutional rights.11 2
Specifically, the petitioner contended that the racially restrictive covenant
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.113
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioners and held that en-
forcement of racially restrictive covenants was unconstitutional. 1 4 How-
ever, it is important to note that the Shelley Court did not specifically
renounce racially restrictive covenants. The Court held that racially re-
strictive covenants alone did not violate constitutional rights.' Rather,
the judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenants would violate
the petitioner's rights because it constituted state action.Y6 The Court
further held that the state cannot deny an individual's right to due pro-
cess under the Fourteenth Amendment through state action.117 The Shel-
ley decision seemed to influence other challenges to racially restrictive
covenants." 8 Courts throughout the nation cited to Shelley in racially
restrictive covenant cases.
Texas courts also began to follow the Shelley ruling. After 1948, Texas
courts held that racially restrictive covenants were not enforceable be-
cause such enforcement would constitute state action. However, prior to
1948, Texas state courts had no problem enforcing racially restrictive cov-
enants. The enforcement of these covenants had a negative effect on the
Mexican-American community. The ruling in Shelly v. Kraemer was per-
haps too little, too late.
The Shelley decision was influential in a San Antonio case that dealt
with racially restrictive covenants and a Mexican-American family.119
Shortly after the Shelley decision, in Clifton v. Puente, the Texas Fourth of
Appeals held that it could not enforce racially restrictive covenants.1 20 In
Clifton, the appellant sought a judgment in trespass to try title by arguing
that Mr. Puente's chain of title contained a racially restrictive covenant.
The Clifton court looked to the Shelly ruling and held that enforcement
of the racially restrictive covenant would constitute state action. As a
result, the Clifton court struck down the covenant. 21
The Clifton decision, however, may have also been too little, too late.
Between the 1910s and the 1940s, courts throughout the nation upheld
112. See generally iL
113. 1& at 7-8.
114. Id. at 20.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See Matthews v. Andrade, 198 P.2d 66 (Cal. App. 1948).
119. See Clifton v. Puente, 218 S.W.2d 272 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1948).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 274.
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racially restrictive covenants. The enforcement of these racially restric-
tive covenants during the 1910s, 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s have had a last-
ing effect on many Mexican-American communities and the effects of
these racially restrictive covenants remain visible.
The patterns of de facto segregation still exist in San Antonio today.1 22
As San Antonio has grown, decisions to build the University of Texas at
San Antonio and the University of Texas Health Science Center toward
the city's north side, while simultaneously concentrating public housing
projects on the west side, were based on race separation.'23 Sadly, class-
rooms throughout San Antonio reflect the present-day segregation
among Mexican Americans, African Americans, and Anglo Americans.
Churchill High School, on San Antonio's north side, has an Anglo stu-
dent population of seventy-six percent and a Mexican-American student
population of eighteen-percent. 24 San Antonio's primary west-side
school district, the Edgewood Independent School District, has a student
population consisting of ninety-six percent Mexican Americans.125
IV. THE LONG TERM IMPACT OF RACIALLY RESTRICTIVE
COVENANTS ON MEXICAN AMERICANS IN SAN ANTONIO
The poverty that many Mexican Americans experience today is partly
the result of residential segregation created by racially restrictive cove-
nants. The enforcement of racially restrictive covenants has had a contin-
uing negative effect on the Mexican-American community. Today, San
Antonio is still divided geographically along ethnic lines. This type of
residential segregation has helped perpetuate the poverty that many
Mexican Americans and other minorities experience. Traditionally, Mex-
ican Americans living in San Antonio have been less educated, poorer,
and have lived in worse housing conditions than their Anglo-American
counterparts.126 In addition, studies conducted in the 1970s showed that
Mexican-American neighborhoods received lower levels of municipal ser-
122. Brischetto, Cotrell & Stevens, supra note 1, at 76.
123. See Jeanne Russell, S.A. Reflects Resegregation Trend, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-
NEws, June 12, 1999, at A15 (citing an interview with Al Kauffman, regional counsel for
the Mexican-American Legal Defense and Educational Fund), available at 1999 WL
100169390.
124. Editorial, School Segregation: A Giant Step Back, SAN ANTONIO EXPREss-NEws,
June 21, 1999, at 21A.
125. See Student Information, Edgewood News (Edgewood Independent School Dis-
trict, San Antonio, Tex.), Jan. 2001, at 11.
126. See ROSALES, supra note 33, at 5 (describing Mexican Americans as predomi-
nantly poor or lower middle class); Brischetto, Cotrell & Stevens, supra note 1, at 76
(describing the social inequality Mexican Americans experience).
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vices than Anglo-American neighborhoods.127 For example, west-side
neighborhoods often did not receive the same federal and state govern-
ment funding as north-side neighborhoods for street paving, drainage sys-
tems, and public libraries. 128
Importantly, many of the same social problems that Mexican Ameri-
cans faced when racial covenants were enforced are still present today." 9
Residential mobility among Mexican Americans is lower in San Antonio
than in other cites, such as Los Angeles.130 While many of the old ra-
cially restrictive neighborhoods have been integrated, the effects of these
restrictive covenants had a lasting impact on the social and economic sta-
tus of Mexican Americans.' 31 Since many Mexican-American families
were forced to live on the west side of San Antonio, they were unable to
take part in the same educational and occupational opportunities as many
white citizens.' 32 Instead, Mexican-American families were forced to
send their children to poorly funded schools, where they subsequently
received a poor education.133
For generations, San Antonio has segregated its schools in a manner
"that parallels the development of segregated neighborhoods."" As a
result, many Mexican Americans were not allowed to experience main-
stream American ideas and values. 35 Mexican Americans in San
Antonio and-throughout the Southwest were prevented from assimilating
into mainstream America. They were not introduced to values that most
white Americans believe are important. These American values include
"achievement, efficiency, material comfort, . . . equality, and the
127. Brischetto, Cotrell & Stevens, supra note 1, at 76.
128. Id.
129. RoDoLFo RoSALEs, PERSONALITY AND STYLE IN SAN ANToNIo PoLrMcAs:
HENRY CIsNERos AND BERNARDO EURESTE, 1975-1985, at 3 (David Montejano ed., Univ.
of Tex. Press 1999).
130. See GREBLER ET AL., supra note 1, at 307 (comparing the residential mobility of
Los Angeles and San Antonio).
131. Brischetto, Cotrell & Stevens, supra note 1, at 76 (describing how de facto segre-
gation continues to exist today).
132. See GARCiA, supra note 33, at 38.
133. RosALEs, supra note 33, at 5 (stating that racially restrictive covenants forced
Mexican Americans to attend inferior schools); Harris, supra note 3, at 71 (describing how
a lack of integration has resulted in social, economic, and educational inequality for Mexi-
can Americans).
134. Gambitta et al., supra note 2, at 141 (stating that white neighborhoods created
independent school districts while Hispanic neighborhoods did not); Russell, supra note
123.
135. Gambitta et al., supra note 2, at 141 (describing how the racial covenants pre-
served racial homogeneity in schools).
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supremacy of science and reason over faith., 13 6 As a result, Mexican
Americans are less well equipped to achieve economic and social pros-
perity in America.
A. Racially Restrictive Covenants and Their Long-Term Effects on the
Education of Mexican Americans in San Antonio
Traditionally, Mexican Americans throughout South Texas have not at-
tained the same educational levels as their Anglo counterparts. 137 Texas
state courts have played a direct role in creating and maintaining this
inequality. In 1930, a Texas state court held, in Independent School v.
Salvatierra, that a local school district could segregate Mexican-American
students from white students.' 38 The court relied on the testimony from
the school district's superintendent regarding the reasons for separating
the "Mexican" children from the Anglo children.139 The superintendent
testified that "Mexican" students often miss the first part of the school
year because they are helping their family pick cotton. The superinten-
dent further testified that if these "Mexican" students were placed in the
same classroom with Anglo students after the school year started, the
Mexican-American children would fall behind in their learning. 140 How-
ever, unlike the Mexican-American students, Anglo students who also
picked cotton and started the school later in the school year were not
forced to attend the separate class.' 4 ' The court agreed with the superin-
tendent and held that the court should avoid interference with the local
government agencies within communities. 4
Texas state courts have also played an indirect role in contributing to
the inequality of education between Mexican-American children and An-
glo-American children by enforcing racially restrictive covenants. Ra-
cially restrictive covenants have had an immense negative effect on
Mexican-American educational opportunity.'43
136. See SCHAEFER, supra note 12, at 59 (identifying American values); RoniN M.
WILLIAMS JR., AMERICAN SOCIETY: A SOCIOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION 452-500 (3d ed.
1970).
137. GREBLER ET AL., supra note 1, at 143. See generally MOORE, supra note 1, at 109
(stating that the educational attainment of Mexican Americans was lower than not only
whites, but other non-whites as well).
138. See generally Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Salvatierra, 33 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. App. 1930) (al-
lowing the Del Rio Independent School District to segregate Mexican-American school
children from white school children).
139. See id. at 791.
140. See id. at 792.
141. See id.
142. See id. at 794.
143. See ROSALES, supra note 33, at 5 (asserting that racially restrictive covenants
isolated Mexican Americans and forced them to attend inferior schools). See generally
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1. Racially Restrictive Covenants Forced Mexican Americans to
Live in San Antonio's West-Side Neighborhoods
As Texas state courts upheld racially restrictive covenants, their rulings
forced Mexican Americans to live in San Antonio's west-side neighbor-
hoods. In addition, local initiatives forced Mexican-American children to
attend inferior schools.'" Consequently, Mexican-American families be-
gan to cluster around the Edgewood Independent School District,14 5
which is located on the west side of San Antonio. Edgewood students
had fewer library books, counselors, and course offerings.146 In addition,
Edgewood students achieved lower scores on standardized tests than stu-
dents from affluent districts.147
Racially restrictive covenants forced Mexican-American families to live
in San Antonio's west-side neighborhoods and to send their children to
poorly funded schools. Mexican-American families could not live in
other school districts, such as the Alamo Heights School District on San
Antonio's north side." For example, during the 1967-68 school year,
Alamo Heights High School spent over two and one quarter times the
amount Edgewood spent on its students. 49 In the 1920s and 1930s, the
Edgewood School District area had a low percentage of residential cove-
nants, thus allowing the sale of property to Mexican-American fami-
lies.1 0 San Antonio's west-side neighborhood schools also established a
different curriculum from schools with Anglo children.151 Mexican
Americans were taught to believe that segregated education was neces-
sary.152 As a result, these poor west-side neighborhood schools did not
introduce Mexican-American students to traditional American values. 153
These Mexican-American families had no choice but to send their chil-
dren to schools where "a vocational orientation, not a professional orien-
Gambitta et al., supra note 2, at 133, 134 (describing how racially restrictive covenants
forced Mexican Americans to live in San Antonio's west-side neighborhoods, resulting in
low property value and poor school funding).
144. RosALas, supra note 33, at 5.
145. See Gambitta et al., supra note 2, at 141 (describing how Mexican Americans in
San Antonio were forced to live within the Edgewood Independent School District).
146. See id. at 156.
147. See id
148. See id. at 142.
149. See i. at 146.
150. See id. at 142-43 (describing how the Edgewood neighborhood, on San Antonio's
west side, was one of the few places Mexican Americans did not encounter racially restric-
tive covenants).
151. See GARCiA, supra note 33, at 177 (describing the educational conditions in west-
side neighborhoods).
152. See id.
153. Id.
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tation, segregation, not integration, were established as the philosophical
cornerstones for the Mexican student population.1 54
2. Racially Restrictive Covenants Indirectly Forced Generations of
Mexican Americans Living in San Antonio to Attend
Poorly Funded and Inadequate Schools
The enforcement of racially restrictive covenants contributed to the
poor education Mexican-American children received in San Antonio.
Although it is difficult to provide clear and convincing proof that segrega-
tion creates inferior schooling, research shows that educational segrega-
tion provides a pattern of inadequate funding, high dropout rates, and
few qualified teachers.' 5 An increasing number of Mexican-American
students are attending public schools isolated from Anglo students.' 5
These public schools tend to have poor funding and low standards of aca-
demic performance.' 57 Like African-American children in the South,
who were educated in isolation from Anglo-American children,' Mexi-
can Americans continue to face segregation.
Generally, Mexican Americans are most likely to be segregated into
high poverty schools. 159 Today, many West-side San Antonio neighbor-
hood schools, which teach predominately Mexican-American children,
still experience a lack of integration, poor funding, and generally inade-
quate schooling.' 60 Today, ninety-six percent of the Edgewood Indepen-
dent School District student population is Mexican-American. 16 1 The
inability of San Antonio's west-side neighborhood schools to provide suf-
ficient funds for its students is perhaps the most pervasive effect racially
restrictive covenants- have had on the Mexican-American community.
The Edgewood Independent School District, which many Mexican-
American children were forced to attend because of racially restrictive
covenants, has always spent disproportionately less on their students than
the Alamo Heights Independent School District, which is on San
154. Id.
155. See Russell, supra note 123.
156. See id. (citing to a trend that Hispanic and African-American students attend
public schools that are isolated from Anglo students).
157. See id.
158. See Deborah Mayo-Jeffries, Discrimination in the Education Process Based on
Race, 21 N.C. CEr. L.J. 21 (1995).
159. See Russell, supra note 123.
160. See Gambitta et al., supra note 2, at 156. See generally J. Steven Farr & Mark
Trachtenberg, The Edgewood Drama: An Epic Quest for Education Equity, 17 YALn L. &
PoL'Y REv. 607 (1999) (describing the lack of funding the Edgewood Independent School
District has experienced).
161. See Newsletter, Edgewood Independent School District (Nov. 2001).
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Antonio's North Side.' 62 Wealthy districts, such as the Alamo Heights
School District, can spend up to nine times more on each student than
poorer school districts like Edgewood.163
This disproportion in wealth can be seen in the everyday activities at
each school district. For example, at Edgewood Elementary School, a
janitor has to rip bats from the eaves of the school, while a custodian at
Alamo Heights High School has to check the chlorine level of the
school's indoor, Olympic-size pool."6 During the 1970s, almost half the
teachers at Edgewood Elementary School lacked official state certifica-
tion, while rare vacant teaching positions in the Alamo Heights School
District would attract several well-qualified applicants. 65 In addition,
Edgewood has had a difficult time recruiting quality teachers when
Alamo Heights pays its teachers thousands of dollars more per year than
Edgewood.' 66 During the 1999-2000 school year, the average salary for
an Edgewood School District teacher was $37,747, while in the Alamo
Heights School District, the average teacher salary was $44,590.167
The Edgewood and Alamo Heights school districts serve as a constant
reminder of the failure of the Texas school finance program.)6 Simply
put, students living in San Antonio's west-side neighborhoods receive
considerably less funding than students living in north-side neighbor-
hoods. Although racially restrictive covenants are no longer enforced,
their negative effects are still present. The disparities in education have
perpetuated the racial and economic disparity that has characterized San
Antonio for generations. 69 These negative effects are visible in the ineq-
uitable funding and in the quality of education that the west-side neigh-
borhoods receive when compared to the north-side neighborhoods.
162. Farr & Trachtenberg, supra note 160, at 607 (emphasizing the huge disparity be-
tween the Edgewood Independent School District and the Alamo Heights Independent
School District).
163. See id at 608 (describing the disproportional amount the Texas school finance
system allows among different school districts).
164. See idU at 607 (describing the results of disproportional school funding).
165. See id.
166. See id. at 608.
167. Texas Education Agency: 1999-2000 Staff Salaries and FIE count: Alamo
Heights District (January 3, 2001), available at http.//www.tea.state.tx.usJadhocrpt/ad-
peboo.html.
168. See Gambitta et al., supra note 2, at 156; Farr & Trachtenberg, supra note 160, at
607.
169. See generally Gambitta et al., supra note 2, at 156 (describing the long-term ef-
fects of the educational disparities).
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B. Racially Restrictive Covenants and the Long Term Effect of
Isolating Mexican Americans from American Values
By forcing Mexican Americans to live on San Antonio's west side, ra-
cially restrictive covenants prevented Mexican Americans from assimilat-
ing mainstream American values. Like many other minority groups,
Mexican Americans generally have found it difficult to assimilate into
mainstream American society.'7 ° Mexican Americans do assimilate to
some degree. However, full political and economic assimilation eludes
the Mexican-American community. 171 The measure of an immigrant
group's assimilation into American society can be determined by the
level of segregation that the particular immigrant group still exper-
iences. 72 San Antonio's close proximity to Mexico makes it possible for
many Mexican Americans to maintain a close connection to their cultural
heritage.'7 However, this close cultural connection inhibits social and
occupational integration.174
Since schools are one of the most important socializing institutions in
our society, 175 they have great influence on the assimilation of Mexican-
American children into mainstream American culture. American main-
stream values emphasize material comfort and progress by believing that
living conditions improve through hard work.176 Racially restrictive cov-
enants prevented Mexican Americans from being indoctrinated into
these mainstream America ideals. Instead, Mexican Americans were seg-
regated into San Antonio's west-side neighborhoods and isolated from
the predominant American culture.177
Generally, lack of education and the failure to assimilate has had a
negative role in occupational integration.' 78 Studies have shown that the
best academic performers among Mexican-American students are those
"who have been most thoroughly socialized" into American culture. 79
170. See Kevin R. Johnson, "Melting Pot" Or "Ring of Fire"?: Assimilation and the
Mexican-American Experience, 10 LA RAZA L.J. 173, 194 (1998); Rachel F. Moran, For-
ward-Demography and Distrust: The Latino Challenge to Civil Rights and Immigration Pol-
icy in the 1990s and Beyond, 8 LA RAZA L.J. 1, 13-24 (1995); Villarreal, supra note 12, at
1196-1215.
171. Johnson, supra note 170, at 194.
172. MooRE, supra note 1, at 109.
173. Harris, supra note 3, at 57.
174. Id.
175. Villarreal, supra note 12, at 1200.
176. See SCHAEFER, supra note 12, at 59 (identifying traditional American values);
WILLIAMS JR., supra note 136, at 452-500.
177. See generally Gambitta et al., supra note 2, at 141-42.
178. MAluo BARIERA, RACE ANDo CLAss IN THE SouTmwEsT 145 (1979).
179. GREBLER ET AL., supra note 1, at 171 (describing how assimilation into Ameri-
can society helps Mexican-American students in schools).
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Today, many Mexican Americans in San Antonio's west-side neighbor-
hoods still maintain a strong, traditionally Mexican culture. Many Mexi-
can Americans are not able to identify with mainstream American
values. 80 Some of these values include achievement, efficiency, material
comfort, equality, and the supremacy of science and reason over faith.'
The lack of exposure to mainstream American values has inhibited the
academic performance of Mexican-American students in San Antonio's
west-side neighborhoods.
V. PROPOSAL
A. How Do We Remedy the Damage That Racially Restrictive
Covenants Inflicted on Mexican Americans in San Antonio?
Racially restrictive covenants have indirectly contributed to the poor
education level of many Mexican Americans living in San Antonio's
west-side neighborhoods. In addition, racially restrictive covenants have
also contributed to the isolationism that many Mexican Americans in San
Antonio experience. The end result is that children are favored or disfa-
vored on the basis of geography because of previous discrimination based
on ethnicity."8 It is unjust for any child in America to be deprived of
educational and economic opportunities simply because the child lives in
a neighborhood that was negatively affected by racially restricted cove-
nants. The issue then becomes how to correct the effect of these old ra-
cially restrictive covenants?
One way to remedy the negative effects of these restrictive covenants is
to introduce a proposal that helps undo the isolationism and poor educa-
tional conditions that Mexican Americans in San Antonio experience to-
day. As stated earlier, the negative effects of racially restrictive
covenants are still visible in the inequitable availability of quality educa-
tion throughout San Antonio. The enforcement of racially restrictive
covenants forced Mexican Americans to live in San Antonio's poor, west-
side neighborhoods. The public schools in San Antonio's west-side
neighborhoods have received far less funding and have far less qualified
teachers than public schools in the north-side neighborhoods. Perhaps if
poor west-side neighborhood schools were given the same amount of
funding and the same ability to pay qualified teachers as north-side neigh-
180. Johnson, supra note 170, at 194.
181. See SCHAEFER, supra note 12, at 59 (identifying American values); WILUaNIS JR.,
supra note 136, at 452-500.
182. See Mark G. Yudof, School Finance Reform: Don't IVorry, Be Happy, 10 RE-v.
LrrMG. 585 (1991) (asserting that poor school districts have to exert higher tax efforts than
rich school districts).
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borhood schools, the long term negative effects of racially restrictive cov-
enants would be lessened.
One of the most effective potential remedies would be to reform and
consolidate the Texas educational system so it would provide an equally
funded education, in order to provide the same curriculum to all citizens
of San Antonio and throughout Texas. Throughout the country, how-
ever, state courts have faced challenges to the methods by which states
fund public education. 83 These state courts have seen various arguments
attacking the method of funding public schools through property tax.
184
One such argument against the use of property tax to fund public schools
contends that the state's equal protection clause should not allow differ-
ence in property wealth to affect different public school systems.
185
B. Eliminating Independent School Districts and Consolidating the
Texas Educational System
Eliminating independent school districts and consolidating public
schools under an effective state funded system would serve to lessen or
eliminate the long-term effects of racially restrictive covenants. As stated
earlier, Mexican Americans in San Antonio were forced to live in deteri-
orated neighborhoods and to send their children to under-funded public
schools that provided an inadequate education. Mexicans Americans,
along with every other citizen in San Antonio, need a reformed education
system that will undo the harm racially restrictive covenants still
perpetuate.
1. General Concepts of Consolidation
Consolidating school districts is potentially one of the most effective
ways to improve school performance.' 86 Consolidation, however, has
proven to be a more popular concept among academics than with legisla-
tors and their constituents.' 87 Nevertheless, there are advantages and dis-
183. See Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Direction in School Finance
Reform, 48 VAND. L. REv. 101, 104 (1995) (describing how different states are having
problem providing equal funding); Farr & Trachtenberg, supra note 160, at 608-09; Keith
Henderson, In Many States, Lawsuits Contest the Fairness of School Funding, CHRISTIAN
SCL MONrOR (Mar. 23, 1993), at 1.
184. See Enrich, supra note 183, at 106.
185. See id. at 107 (stating the various arguments against the use of property tax to
fund public schools, including the contention that the state's duty to provide a public
school system cannot be satisfied through property tax revenue).
186. See Susan R. Stockdale, School Consolidation and Minnesota's Fire Safety Inspec-
tion Law: A Step Too Far, 11 LAW & INEQ. 117 (1992).
187. See Weldon Beckner & Linda O'Neal, A New View of Smaller Schools, 64
NASSP BULL. 1, 5 (1980); Stockdale, supra note 186.
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advantages to consolidating school districts into one state agency.18
Commonly cited advantages of consolidation include (1) improved and
enlarged curriculum, (2) increased administrative efficiency, and (3) an
increased likelihood that a school will win state or national recogni-
tion. 89 The disadvantages include (1) an increase in discipline problems,
(2) increase in dropouts, and (3) decreased opportunities for leadership
roles.190
2. A Brief History of the Texas School System
a. Using Property Tax Revenue to Fund School Districts
The Texas Constitution provides a mandate for the state to provide
public schools. 9' Under Article VII of the Texas Constitution, "it shall
be the duty of the Legislature of the State to establish and make suitable
provisions for the support and maintenance of an efficient system of pub-
lic free schools." 192 However, Texas State courts have never clearly de-
fined the phrase "efficient system of public free schools." 193
The Texas public school system financed its educational system through
property taxes.i 94 Since the state lacked sufficient organization to admin-
ister a state run school system,195 the state turned to property taxes to
fund public schools.' 9 6 In 1845, Article X of the Texas Constitution di-
rected the legislature to fund public schools through property taxes."9
By 1848, the Texas Legislature had obtained the plenary power to grant
municipalities authority to levy a local property tax for school support.19
Many cities then obtained permission for the Texas Legislature to organ-
ize their schools as independent schools districts. 99
188. See Stockdale, supra note 186, at 121.
189. See id. at 122.
190. See id. at 122-23.
191. See Farr & Trachtenberg, supra note 160, at 608.
192. TEx. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
193. Farr & Trachtenberg, supra note 160, at 607 (describing the ambiguity in the
Texas Constitution regarding its mandate for an efficient school system).
194. See id. at 613.
195. See Billy D. Walker, Intent of the Framers in the Education Provisions of the
Texas Constitution of 1876, 10 REv. LrIa. 625, 630 (1991) (citing Arthur Lynn, Property-
Tax Development: Selected Historical Perspectives, in PROPERTY TAXAnON, U.S.A. 7, 13
(R Lindhoim ed., 1967)) (noting that the state could not administer a school program and
was not willing to develop a tax system to support public schools).
196. See Farr & Trachtenberg, supra note 160, at 613 (explaining Texas' use of prop-
erty tax to fund schools); Walker, supra note 195, at 630 (describing how the Texas Legisla-
ture used property taxes to fund public school education).
197. See Tnx. CONST. of 1845, art. X, § 2.
198. See Walker, supra note 195, at 636.
199. See id. at 637.
2001]
THE SCHOLAR
The 1948 and 1949 Gilmer-Akin proposals required public schools to
be financed through local property tax efforts.200 The State also provided
aid to compensate for the variation in local tax bases.20' The Gilmer-
Akin proposal essentially provided a guaranteed minimum for all school
districts. However, under Texas law, local school districts are allowed to
enrich their programs beyond the minimum guarantee. 0 2 As a result,
rich school districts in San Antonio can tax a low percentage, but spend
large amounts, while poor school districts in San Antonio must tax at a
high percentage in order to merely spend low. 03 For example, during the
1985-86 school year, the Alamo Heights Independent School District
spent $570,109 per student, while the Edgewood Independent School Dis-
trict spent $38,854 per student.20 4 In 2000, the Alamo Heights district,
with a 4,400 student population, had a $40 million dollar budget, while
the 57,500 student San Antonio School district had a budget of $389 mil-
lion dollars.2 5
b. Trying to Solve the Disparity in School Funding
While some state legislators realized the problem with this funding
method, the Texas Legislature was unsuccessful in passing legislation to
eliminate the disparity.20 6 The Texas Supreme Court has struck down
three different legislative attempts designed to eliminate the disparities of
school funding.207
200. See William P. Hobby & Billy D. Walker, Legislative Reform of the Texas Public
School Finance System, 1973-1991, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 379, 382 (1991) (describing how
the Gilmer-Akin proposal provided a guaranteed minimum for all students from property
tax funds).
201. See Farr & Trachtenberg, supra note 160, at 608; Hobby & Walker, supra note
200, at 382-83.
202. See BILLY D. WALKER & DANIEL T. CASEY, THE BASIS OF TEXAs PUI3LIC
SCHOOL FINANCE 85 (6th ed. 1996); Farr & Trachtenberg, supra note 160, at 613.
203. See Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. 1989); see
also Farr & Trachtenberg, supra note 160, at 615.
204. See Kirby, 777 S.W.2d at 392.
205. See Sharon K. Hughes, AHSD and Robin Hood: Arrow of Outrageous Fortune?,
SAN AroNIO EXPREss-NEws, Apr. 24, 2000, at B3.
206. See Joe Ball, Efficient and Suitable Provision for the Texas Public School Finance
System: An Impossible Dream?, 46 SMU L. REv. 763, 768-80 (1992). In 1996, the Texas
Legislature rushed to pass Senate Bill 1, which raised the level of per pupil expenditure.
See id. However, the Texas Supreme Court found that Senate Bill 1 did not effect change
in the school finance system and failed to meet its constitutional obligation. See id. In
1991, the legislature enacted a new bill, Senate Bill 351. See id. However, the Supreme
Court rejected this bill on constitutional grounds under article VIII, section 3-e, which
demands an election to levy an additional ad valorem tax. See id.
207. See Henry Cuellar, Considerations in Drafting a Constitutional School Finance
Plan: A Legislator's Perspective, 19 T. MARSHALL L. REv. 83 (1993). On two separate
occasions, the Texas Supreme Court held that legislative proposals violated article VII,
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For example, in Edgewood Independent School District v. Kirby
(Edgewood I),2 the Edgewood Independent School District obtained an
injunction that prevented the Texas Commissioner of Education from fi-
nancing public education from property tax revenues.2°9 However, the
Texas Supreme Court did not use the Equal Protection or Due Process
Clauses of the Federal Constitution in coming to its decision3m' Instead,
the court only decided whether the state provided an "efficient system"
of education required by the Texas Constitution.21 1 In Edgewood I, the
Texas Supreme Court held that the gross inequalities in resources among
school districts violated the state's constitutional mandate of an "efficient
system.
2 12
In response to the Edgevood I ruling, the Texas Legislature tried to
reform the school finance system.2 13 In Edgeivood II,214 however, the
Texas Supreme Court held that the legislature's reforms did not achieve
sufficient equalization.215 The Legislature then drafted nev legislation in
response to the ruling.
In Carrollton-Farmers Branch Independent School v. Edgewood Inde-
pendent School District (Edgeivood II1),216 the Texas Supreme Court
again struck down the legislature's attempt to reform the school finance
system. The court held that the legislation violated a constitutional provi-
sion forbidding property taxation at the state level.217 The Texas Legisla-
ture went to the drawing board one more time in the hope of reforming
the school finance system.
section 1 of the Texas Constitution which gives the legislature the duty to "establish and
make suitable provision for the support and maintenance of an efficient system of public
free school." Id. On the third occasion, the Supreme Court ruled that Senate Bill 351,
which adjusted the finance system, violated other provisions of the Texas Constitution. See
id.
208. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391.
209. See Albert Kauffman & Carmen Maria Rumbaut, Applying Edgewood v. Kirby
to Analysis of Fundamental Rights Under the Teras Constitution, 22 ST. MARY'S LJ. 69,74
(1990) (describing how the case got to court).
210. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391; see also Enrich, supra note 183, at 192.
211. See Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 397-98; see also Enrich, supra note 183, at 192.
212. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d at 398; see also Enrich, supra note 183, at 192 (summarizing
the ruling found in Edgewood Independent School District v. Kirby).
213. See Ball, supra note 206, at 768-69; Enrich, supra note 183, at 192.
214. See generally Edgewood Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 804 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1991)
(holding that Senate Bill 1 failed to provide equal access to funds to all school districts).
215. See generally Enrich, supra note 183, at 192 (summarizing the Texas Supreme
Court's ruling in Edgewood II).
216. See generally Carrollton-Farmers Branch Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Edgewood Ind. Sch.
Dist., 826 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. 1992).
217. See generally Enrich, supra note 183, at 192 (summarizing Edgewood IUl).
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In 1993, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill Seven (SB 7), s18 which
provided a multi-tiered school finance system with four major compo-
nents.219 Essentially, SB 7 provided some extra funding to poor schools,
while still allowing wealthier school districts to provide additional une-
qual revenue from the local tax bases.22 1 In Edgewood 1V,221 the Texas
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of SB 7. However, the
Edgewood decisions show that intervention by the courts cannot provide
effective, long-lasting solutions to deep-rooted educational controver-
sies. 2 The Legislature has still been unable to solve the disparity in the
state school finance system because the Texas Supreme Court never
clearly defined what types of reform are constitutional.2z
For the past several years, Texas lawmakers have suggested other ap-
proaches to solve the disparity in school funding.224 The Texas Legisla-
218. See Tex. S.B. 7, 74th Leg., R.S. (1995).
219. Tex. S.B. 7, 74th Leg., R.S. (1995). See also William E. Sparkman & Fred Hart-
meister, The Edgewood Saga Continues: The Texas School Finance System Is Constitu-
tional-But Not Out of the Woods, 101 EDuc. LAv REp. 509, 511 (1995). Senate Bill 7
contained four general components. Id. The first component is the "available school fund
per-capita allotment," which is an annual interest from the permanent school fund and
proceeds from revenues of motor fuel tax. Id. This first component distributes funds to
rich and poor school districts. Id. The next component, Tier One, provides a basic allot-
ment of $2,300 per average daily attendance of students to each school district. Id. The
third component, Tier Two, allows poor school districts to supplement their Tier One basic
allotment with a locally determined tax rate that is equalized by the state. Id. The fourth
component, Tier Three, allows rich school districts to provide additional local revenues
from the local tax base. Id.
220. See Farr & Trachtenberg, supra note 160, at 684; Sparkman & Hartmelster, supra
note 219, at 511 (stating that SB 7 allowed some of the wealthiest districts to retain some of
their property wealth).
221. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Meno, 893 S.W. 2d 450 (Tex. 1995).
222. See generally Michael A. Rebell & Robert L. Hughes, Schools, Communities, and
the Courts: A Dialogic Approach to Education Reform, 14 YALE L. & POL'y REv. 99
(1996) (emphasizing that state judicial intervention throughout the country has had mixed
results because courts cannot provide solutions).
223. See Allan Parker, Jr. & Michael David Weiss, Litigating Edgewood: Constitt-
tional Standards and Application to Educational Choice, 10 REv. LITIO. 599, 600 (1991)
(emphasizing how the Texas Supreme Court failed to define its standards for rejecting
legislation that violates somewhat vague constitutional provisions).
224. See Mark G. Yudof, School Finance Reform in Texas: The Edgewood Saga, 28
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 499, 500-04 (1991). The first method to solve disparity in the funding
of school districts would be to consolidate school districts. Id. Consolidating the school
districts may increase bureaucratization, however. Id. The second method would be for
the state of Texas to assume full responsibility to relieve a state income tax and district tax
revenues on a nondiscriminatory basis. Id. A state constitutional amendment would be
required before the state could levy a state income tax. Id. The third approach would be
to adopt a "recapture plan," which would take some funds from the wealthier school dis-
tricts to give to the poor. Id. The fourth approach would be to combine these three ap-
proaches with a state subsidy. Id.
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ture has slowly increased funding to aid poorer districts?2 - The increase
in funds has had a positive influence on poor school districts.2 6 Through-
out the state, improvements in standardized test scores in poor school
districts have out-paced those of middle income school districts.2 7 On
the other hand, rich school districts were not pleased with the new fund-
ing schemes proposed by the legislature?2- In April 2000, the new fund-
ing formula forced the Alamo Heights School District to pay $10.9
million back to the state to be redistributed to poorer schools. 9 The
superintendent for Alamo Heights School District complained that the
latest finance formula does not allow the rich school districts to hold on
to enough revenue "to keep pace with inflation."" 0 A huge disparity in
funding still exists, however, between west-side neighborhood schools
and north-side neighborhood schools.
The reason why the Texas Legislature has not solved the finance prob-
lem is because many legislators will not vote on a bill in which their dis-
trict loses money. 3 ' It seems that the key to providing efficient and
adequate public education "in Texas is to restructure the state's tax sys-
tem to include a personal and corporate income tax." 2 ' A state income
tax is very unlikely, however, given the political hostility it evokes. 3 As
a result, "the pursuit of school finance reform inevitably becomes a strug-
gle between state and local officials to avoid political accountability for
tough and unpopular tax policies."'
Sadly, school finance reform cannot rely on the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution
225. See William E. Sparkman & Michael P. Stevens, Texas Sdtool Finance System
Unconstitutional, 57 ED. LAv. RrP. 333 (1990) (describing the incremental remedies the
Texas Legislature tried to implement).
226. See Terrence Stutz, Extra Funding Credited with Raising Test Score" Low-Wealth
Districts Tout Redistribution Program, DALLAS MoRNuING Nr-%%s, Aug. 15, 2000, at 1A
(describing how sharing the wealth in school funding has helped poor school districts).
227. See id. (describing how the increase in school funding by the state has helped
poor school districts improve on standardized tests scores).
228. See Hughes, supra note 205 (noting the amount of tax dollars that Alamo
Heights opposed giving up).
229. See id. (describing how Alamo Heights had to pay to the state so the money
could be redistributed to poor districts).
230. Id.
231. See Cuellar, supra note 207, at 90 (describing how "a legislator will vote for the
bill that will bring the most money to his home school districts").
232. See Ball, supra note 206, at 801 (describing the tax consequences and deductions
of a state income tax); Nancy Cotton, The Man with the Plan: Sharp Discusses His New
Idea as Comptroller, TEx. LoNzE STAR, June 1991, at 18, 19.
233. Ball, supra note 206, at 801 (noting the unlikelihood of having a state income tax
approved by voters).
234. Yudof, supra note 182, at 591.
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to challenge a state's method of financing public education 2 35 In San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, the plaintiffs argued
that the Texas public school finance system violated the Equal Protection
Clause because the school finance system discriminated against the poor
and violated their fundamental right to an education.236 However, the
United States Supreme Court disagreed with the plaintiff's position and
held that education is not a fundamental right and upheld the constitu-
tionality of the Texas school finance system.2 7 Therefore, school finance
reformers can only turn to challenges based on the state constitution to
fight finance disparities," 8 as evidenced by Edgewood v. Kirby.
3. Has School Consolidation Been Fully Explored?
One option that has not been fully explored is to consolidate the vari-
ous school districts under one Texas educational system. 2 39 Although for-
mer Texas House Speaker Gib Lewis proposed a school consolidation
plan, it received little support among legislators.24 Ironically, Texas pub-
lic schools were, at one time, under one centralized funding scheme.241
By the end of the Civil War, the Reconstruction Republicans in the Texas
Legislature created a new approach to public education.242 Conse-
quently, in 1870, the Republican controlled state legislature passed legis-
lation mandating an independent state school superintendent and
centralized funding.243 The primary objective of the state was to provide
an education to Anglo-American, Mexican-American, and African-
American children. 2' As a result, San Antonio public schools fell under
the centralized approach.
235. See Joseph S. Patt, School Finance Battles: Survey Says? It's All Just a Change in
Attitudes, 34 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rv. 547, 548 (1999) (asserting that school finance re-
formers can not challenge their state's method of finance under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
236. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 58-59 (1973); see also
Bernard Lau, Edgewood Independent School District v. Kirby: A Political Question?, 43
BAYLOR L. Rv. 187 (1991) (describing plaintiff's argument).
237. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35; see also Lau, supra note 236 (mentioning the U.S.
Supreme Court's holding that education is not a fundamental right).
238. See Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. 1989); see
also Patt, supra note 235, at 548.
239. See generally Farr & Trachtenberg, supra note 160, at 677 (describing the Texas
Legislature's brief contemplation and rejection of a consolidation plan).
240. See Cuellar, supra note 207, at 93-94 (describing the proposed consolidation plan
for the state's 1,055 school districts into 188 mega-districts divided along county lines).
241. See generally Gambitta et al., supra note 2, at 137.
242. See id.
243. See id.
244. See id.
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However, many Texans felt threatened by this centralized, republican
approach?45 In some instances, violent protests occurred, resulting in the
burning of schoolhouses and physical abuse of teachers who taught mi-
nority children.246 In the early 1870s, Southern Democrats regained con-
trol of the state legislature and returned the control and finance of
education to the localities.24 7 In 1883, an amendment to the Texas Con-
stitution allowed the formation of independent school districts. 48
4. How Would Consolidation Address the Effects of Racially
Restrictive Covenants?
Today, school consolidation is not an attractive option for state legisla-
tors.24 9 The political ramifications of consolidating the school districts
would harm many Texas legislators during their bids for re-election. 5 ° In
order to undo the harm and inequalities that racially restrictive covenants
created, Mexican-American families living in San Antonio's west-side
neighborhoods should be afforded the same opportunities as citizens on
San Antonio's north side. There is tremendous evidence that racially re-
strictive covenants forced Mexican Americans to live on San Antonio's
west side.5' These Mexican-American families were unable to obtain
the economic ability to move out of the once segregated west-side neigh-
borhoods. San Antonio's west side has always consisted of poor neigh-
borhoods with low property value. During the 1999-2000 school year, the
property in the Edgewood School District was valued at $423,883,947,
while the property in the Alamo Heights School District was valued at
$1,890,692,234. 252 Under the current Texas educational system, the prop-
erty tax from San Antonio's west-side neighborhoods used to fund local
neighborhood schools is not sufficient to achieve "efficient" education.
Inexperienced teachers, large classes, deteriorating school buildings, and
a lack of textbooks, library books, and laboratory equipment plague chil-
245. See id at 138.
246. See id
247. See id.
248. See TEx. CONST. art. VII, § 3 (amended 1926). See also Steve Bickerstaff, Voting
Rights Challenges to School Boards in Texas: What Next?, 49 BAYLOR L REv. 1017, 1019
(1997).
249. See generally Farr & Trachtenberg, supra note 160.
250. See generally Cuellar, supra note 207, at 90; Farr & Trachtenberg, supra note 160,
at 615 (discussing the disparity in the taxing scheme of different school districts).
251. See generally Gambitta et al., supra note 2, at 142.
252. Texas Education Agency, Data Central; District Graduated by Gender, Ethnicity
& Program for School Year 1998-1999 Alamo Heights ISD (015901), Jan. 3, 2001, available
at http://www.tea.state.tx.uscgi/.
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dren who attend these deficient schools. 253 'Consequently, Mexican-
American families living in San Antonio's west side cannot afford to pro-
vide an adequate academic and social education. The enforcement of ra-
cially restrictive covenants was a major factor that contributed to this
lingering problem for the Mexican-American community.
5. The Feasibility of Consolidating Texas Public Schools and the
Potential for Undoing the Harm of Racially Restrictive
Covenants
The Texas Legislature has the power to remedy the negative effects
that racially restrictive covenants have had on Mexican Americans and
other minority groups in Texas. By consolidating the public school sys-
tem so that public schools throughout San Antonio provide equally well-
funded education, the Texas Legislature will help Mexican Americans
who have been deprived of equal education. The state legislature has the
plenary power to consolidate school districts.254 Consolidation will pro-
vide equal funding to every public school.
Specifically, by consolidating the various school districts into one state-
funded program, a centralized funding scheme could be developed.
However, local school districts would still maintain the decision-making
autonomy they retain today. Under a centralized funding scheme, the
school districts would not rely on local property tax as their primary
means of education funding.5 5 Funding may come from a state sales tax
so that school districts, regardless of their taxable wealth, could enjoy the
same revenue. 6 The Texas Legislature has tried to reform the school
finance system by working with judicial mandates to draft a bill that is
constitutional. 5 7 As noted earlier, however, the Legislature has been un-
successful." 8 On the other hand, consolidation may not create a judicial
challenge like other reforms. Instead, consolidating school districts under
a centralized funding scheme would treat every student equally. How-
253. See Charles S. Benson, Definitions of Equity in School Finance in Texas, New
Jersey, and Kentucky, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 401, 402 (1991); Benson & O'Halloran, The
Economic History of School Finance in the United States, 12 J. EDUC. FiN. 495, 511-512
(1987); see also A. WISE, RiCH SCHOOLS, PooR SCHOOLS 134-42 (1972).
254. See Lund v. Schrader, 492 P.2d 202 (Wyo. 1971); Sch. Dist. No. 9 of Tillamook
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ever, the judicial reaction to centralized funding attempts has yet to be
seen.
a. Where Would Funding Come From?
The money needed to provide a centralized funding scheme would
come from the state; however, municipal and county governments must
also play a greater role in educating its citizens. Using the taxing mecha-
nisms and infrastructure already in place, the state should require munici-
pal and county governments to contribute funds to a centralized funding
scheme. This revenue would then be re-distributed equally to schools
throughout the state, thereby allowing every child to receive an equally
funded education.
There are two obstacles that need to be overcome. First, state legisla-
tors need to devise a formula so that every municipal and county govern-
ment contributes their fair percentage of revenue. Second, municipal and
county elected officials may be uncooperative in contributing to the cen-
tralized funding scheme.
b. Allowing Local Citizens to Control Where Money Is Spent
in Each School
Currently, elected school board members have the power to vote on
various issues within their respective school districts. Under a centralized
funding scheme, local citizens are elected and will have the same ability
to decide how the funding will be dispersed throughout schools. Thus,
local citizens will still be able to make important decisions on policy mat-
ters for their respective schools. Schools will receive equal funding while
local citizens direct how schools should spend those funds. A more de-
tailed analysis of how consolidating school districts would provide cen-
tralized funding must be conducted. Such an analysis, however, is beyond
the scope of this proposal.
VI. CONCLUSION
Racially restrictive covenants forced Mexican Americans to live in San
Antonio's west-side neighborhoods. Mexican-American families were
then forced to send their children to neighborhood schools that were
poorly equipped to provide the same type of education that Anglo-Amer-
ican children receive on San Antonio's north-side. Under the Texas
school finance system, poor west-side schools were unable to raise suffi-
cient revenue to provide the same type of education that wealthy north-
side schools could provide to their students. Therefore, racially restric-
tive covenants had a negative effect on the educational opportunities of
Mexican Americans. The Texas Legislature failed in its attempts to elimi-
nate the disparity in school funding and educational quality between rich
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and poor school districts. The Texas Legislature has not seriously consid-
ered consolidating the various school districts into one state-run system,
however. Under a school consolidation model, every Texas school would
receive the same amount of funding and hopefully the same level of edu-
cation. The Texas Legislature has the power to provide equal education
to all Texas students and thereby undo the lingering harm caused by ra-
cially restrictive covenants.
